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Abstract 
Over 100 commercial nuclear power plants currently operate 
in the United States. Complex technology and intense regulation 
has mandated a fast-paced evolution of process control and myriad 
use of computer systems to properly govern operation of these 
plants. 
Of all the computer systems in use at the Susquehanna Steam 
Electric Station (SSES), a Pennsylvania Power & Light facility, 
two of the most important are the Advanced Control Room (ACR), 
which governs plant process control, and GETARS, a system that 
monitors operational transient activity. 
To keep these computer systems operating at peak efficiency, 
to serve the plant and the company most effectively, these 
systems must be kept current. Computer technology continues to 
evolve rapidly, and these systems, from a cost standpoint, and 
most importantly, from a safety standpoint, should be 
periodically examined to see if a retrofit, an upgrade, or 
replacement based upon the latest state-of-the-art enhancements 
1s justified. 
Key among these enhancements 1s expert system technology. 
In order for a utility to hold the leading edge in a competitive 
industry, a hard look should be given to the applicability of 
this technology. Expert system versatility makes it attractive 
for decision making applications, as well as, for any tedious 
logic that is currently executed in a cumbersome manual format, 
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using hardcopy procedures, or equivalent media. 
Computer systems are used to monitor the heartbeat of the 
nuclear industry. 
checking the pulse of 
Similarly, the nuclear industry should be 
computer evolution. The most successful 
and the most efficient commercial nuclear power plants are those 
that contain the latest, most judiciously chosen computer 
hardware and software. Prudent retrofit of computer technology 
inevitably results in a payback, by creating cost-effective, 
safely-run energy generation for the public. 
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z:. Introduction 
Nuclear power has been a growth industry in the United 
States from its advent in the 1940's until the Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979. Since then negative public opinion has led to 
a decline in its status to where there are no existing orders for 
any future commercial nuclear power plants in the United States; 
meanwhile, nuclear power still flourishes in other countries such 
as France, Canada, and Japan. This negative public opinion has 
been created by the news media and by public unfamiliarity with 
this technology. Nuclear power to many people is confused with 
the destructive force of nuclear war and weapons, and not with 
the efficient power that it . is. The public does not energy 
realize that the latest generation of sophisticated controls and 
technologies from private industry, and government regulations in 
the use of these technologies, are used to provide safe 
commercial nuclear generation; computer technology in the nuclear 
industry is no exception. 
Nuclear power should be looked at again as a prime source of 
energy for our nation, especially 
devastating phenomena such as 'acid rain' 
since environmentally 
and the 'greenhouse' 
effect have become top concerns among the media and government. 
The 'greenhouse' effect is believed to be caused largely by 
fossil fuel production and its heat-trapping gases that raise 
average ambient temperatures around the world. 
summer of 1988, Senate hearings explored 
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phenomenon where several experts gave their options on the future 
of energy production in the United States. During the hearing, 
comments such as "reviving nuclear power program using passively 
safe economical reactors" and "it's time for America to get rid 
of it's 'nuclear measles'" were stated by two senators. DOE 
Associate Undersecretary D. Fitzpatrick stated that the 
development of advanced nuclear technologies is underway and the 
way of the future. 1 
A 
Nuclear Power has been providing efficient and safe nuclear 
power, and providing the U.S. with 20% of its power from only 104 
reactors. This thesis will address these aspects of computer 
technology and applications which provide information to plant 
control operators and engineers. Following is a brief 
explanation of the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), and 
the theory behind nuclear power generation, to familiarize the 
reader with the application systems that are the basis for the 
computer systems addressed in this thesis. 
SSES consists of two commercial units which have a common 
control room, diesel generators and refueling floor, turbine 
operating deck, radioactive waste system, and other auxiliary 
systems. 
Township, 
SSES is located on a 1075 acre plant site 1n Salem 
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, approximately 20 miles 
southwest of Wilkes-Barre, 50 miles northwest of Allentown and 70 
miles northeast of Harrisburg. 
1 "The Greenhouse: New Climate,Same Old Target", Electrical World, September 1988,pp.13-18. 
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.The Huciear · Steam Supply System (NSSS) for each ·unit .. , 
,, 
con•istl of a General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4 
product l~ne). The containment is a pressure suppression type, 
designated as Mark II. The drywell is a steel-lined concrete 
cone located above the steel-lined concrete cylindrical pressure 
suppression chamber. The drywell and suppression chamber are 
I 
separated by a concrete diaphragm slab which also serves to 
strengthen the entire system. The design core thermal power for 
each unit is 3439 MWt with a corresponding net electrical output 
of 1100 MWe.2 The difference between the thermal megawatts (MWt) 
and the electrical megawatts (MWe) is attributed to plant losses 
from the heat generated 1n the core to the actual electricity 
produced. This translates to an overall 30% efficiency. 
A simplified drawing of the steam cycle in a BWR is 
illustrated in Attachment A. Instead of developing heat by 
burning fuels in a boiler, the Nuclear Power Plant generates heat 
by the fissioning of Uranium nuclei in the fuel within the 
reactor. As stated earlier, the reactor at SSES is a Boiling 
Water Reactor (BWR). The water is boiled and steam is produced 
in the reactor vessel. The water used serves three purposes; 
1. To slow down (moderate) neutrons needed to increase the 
nuclear reaction. 
2. To cool the 'core' from overheating in nuclear reaction. 
3. To become the steam or "thermal power" generated after 
2 "Final Safety Analysis Report",Pennsvlvania Power and Liabt Coappy. 
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the boiling process in the core. 
An illustration of a simplified nuclear reaction is given in 
Attachment B. 
Because the reactor releases energy from the atomic 
structure of the atom, rather than a simple rearrangement of the 
atoms as is done in burning fuel, a far greater amount of energy 
can be developed. The conventional coal fired plant produces 1.5 
kilowatt-hours per pound of coal verses the nuclear power plant 
which produces about 70,000 kilowatt-hours per pound of fuel. 
The remainder of the steam cycle at SSES is similar to a 
fossil fuel plant where the thermal energy from the boiling 
process is transmitted to the turbines to be transformed into 
mechanical energy. At SSES the steam from the reactor enters the 
main turbine through four steam lines to the high pressure 
turbine and the three low pressure turbines. The turbines share 
the same shaft as the main generator to convert the mechanical 
energy from the turbines to electrical power to be transmitted to 
the PP&L's power grid for distribution. The steam is returned to 
the reactor in the form of water via the condenser. The feedwater 
system then reheats the water, and feeds it back to the reactor 
to complete the primary and main steam cycles. 
In addition to this cycle, hundreds of main and auxiliary 
systems are needed so that the plant may run continuously and 
smoothly. Many automatic controls through instrumentation 
provide the plant with automatic responses in normal operating 
conditions. But, it is the prompt and correct operator response 
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to ·process conditions that is needed for unusual plant conditiQri~ 
in any power plant. 
Because of the complexity of the regulatory environment of 
nuclear plants, control room technology, including 
instrumentation, computer controlled equipment, computer systems 
and semi-conductor technology, have been combined to create the 
Advanced Control Room (ACR). 
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II. Advanced Cont·rol Room (ACR) - Present Scope 
The Advanced Control Room (ACR) provides the operator with 
centralized and integrated front panel displays, annunciators, 
and control devices necessary for efficient, coordinated 
operation of the boiling water reactor (BWR) plant during all 
operating conditions. Minimization of the quantity of data which 
the operator must continuously survey, 
reduces the operator response time, 
operator error. 
The Plant Process Computer (PPC) 
analyze, and comprehend 
and the probability for 
aids in improving this 
operator-process interface by continuously monitoring plant 
process variables and displaying various plant process systems on 
cathode ray tubes (CRT's) located on the Unit Monitoring Consoles 
(UMC). The UMC's are activated by the PPC's appropriate warning 
or alarm indications if any parameter reaches a predetermined 
limiting value. 
Attachment C illustrates a simplified version of the SSES 
ACR. Operator controls are arranged 1n panels in logical 
sequence and groups. 
important: 
Briefly, these panels are the most 
o Unit Operating Benchboard 
o Reactor Core Cooling Benchboard 
o Plant Operator Benchboard 
o Unit Services Benchboard 
o Standby Information Panel 
8 
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o Unit Monitoring Console 
The ACR meets the following design requirements: 
1. Improve the operator-process interface in order to 
simplify planned operations without sacrificing 
reliability or safety. 
2. Optimize the quantity of data the operator must observe 
and analyze, thereby decreasing operator response time 
while minimizing operator errors. 
3. Centralize and integrate the control devices which the 
operator must routinely manipulate. 
4. Provide efficient hardware and software display 
techniques to present timely, useful information to the 
operator. 
5. Accurately calculate the core power distribution to 
verify proper reactor operation within thermal safety 
limits. 
6. Provide automatic initiation of the periodic logs and 
special event logs for printout in the control room. 
7. Initiate control rod withdrawal or insertion blocks 
if the prescribed rod movement sequence is not adhered to 
while operating at low power levels, known as the Rod 
Worth Minimizer Prograrn. 3 
3 ''Design Specification for the Advanced Control Room", Pennsylvania Power and Light Company. 
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'l'hr,ee major elements compose the ACR, these are the control room 
configuration, the Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC) and 
·the Plant Process Computer (PPC), which are illustrated in Figure 
1. 
I 
CONTROL 
ROOM 
I 
NSS 
' ·" ' ~~ l 
ACR 
PLANT 
COMPUTER 
PMS 
I 
BOP 
I 
PGCC 
I 
DCS 
I 
HRPD 
Advanced Control Room Block Diagram 
FIGURE 1 
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The control room, which is composed of front and back pariels with 
CRT's, instrumentation and alarm control systems (known as the 
UOB), is the central location for operation and control of the 
unit. The control room is the physical basis of the ACR. The 
PGCC receives electrical signals from the plant and PPC and 
conditions the signal so that it can be used to efficiently 
control the unit. The PPC provides on-line monitoring of 
thousands of input points representing significant process 
variables. The system scans digital and analog input signals at 
specified intervals and activates appropriate alarms and 
indications if monitored analog values exceed predetermined 
limits, or if digital trip signals occur. The PPC performs 
calculations with selected input data to provide the operator 
with essential plant performance information through a variety of 
logs, trends, summaries and other typewritten data arrays. 
Computer output signals also include various displays to color 
CRT's for monitoring system status and parameters. 
The PPC consists of two major systems, the Display Control 
System (DCS) and the Performance Monitoring System (PMS), which 
perform the required functions to achieve more efficient and 
reliable operation of the plant. 
The Display Control System (DCS) scans 625 remote digital 
and analog signals from the process instrumentation, adjusts the 
collected data, and error checks it. It formats the data in 
accordance with the layouts selected for each video monitor on 
the UOB. Nine standard systems are displayed on the front panels 
11 
,,_i ' 
,. 
J'. 
:i .. 
:·;.' 
:, 
' 
• 1n the control room. They are: 
1. RWCU - Reactor Water Clean-Up 
2. Condensate Systems 
3. Feedwater Systems 
4. Recirculation System 
5. Control Rod Drive System 
6 • Neutron Monitoring 
7 . Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff 
8 . Turbine Controls 
9. Generators and Transformers 
Separate "formats" may be selected for each system screen, 
based on plant operations. 
of certain variables. 
Each plant operation requires display 
Switching of formats helps select the 
optimum predefined display for the operating condition. This 
display can be switched locally at each screen by a master 
display control panel for all nine screens. Attachments D and E 
shows the individual CRT selection and the master display control 
panels, respectively. The operator can request a display of any 
system or format on any of the nine CRT's on the Unit Operating 
Benchboard (UOB) within one second in case of any CRT failure. 
Rotary switches and pushbuttons are used to select which of the 
various DCS formats are to be displayed on the CRT. 
The Performance Monitoring System (PMS) performs the 
functions and calculations defined as being necessary for 
efficient operation of the reactor. These functions include 
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monitoring of analog and digital inputs, validations, conversion 
and combination of collected data, and conducting performanc~ 
calculations to determine the actual plant performance. Four 
subsystems provide these functions. They are: 
1. Nuclear Steam Supply Subsystem (NSSS) - uses collected 
data to calculate reactor performance. It provides output 
to peripherals and to permanent storage for later retrieval. 
2. Balance of Plant (BOP) subsystem - uses collected data to 
complete balance of plant performance calculations and to 
provide CRT displays and alarms. 
3. Historical Record and Program Development (HRPD) -
receives input from common core unit and processes the data 
for permanent storage. Development, maintenance and 
updating of programs and formats are also performed by this 
subsystem. 
4. Powerplex (PPX) Subsystem - 1s used with Exxon Fuel and 
replaces General Electric NSS computer functions. . Data 1s 
received from the NSS processor via fiber optic links to the 
Remote Data Analysis System located in a separate building 
at SSES. This data is used to perform in-core monitoring, 
predictions of future core operating conditions and other 
fuel management calculations. 
On the Unit Operating Benchboard, the unit supervisor can 
access a keyboard and CRT display for either DCS and PMS. 
Several display are incorporated PMS. These 
. 
services into 
13 
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• services can be called from the keyboards on the UOB. These 
services include alarm, single point, group point, and video 
display services and logging and trend pen services. Single, 
group and video services are used to create and redefine 
variables and their display format. Logging and trend pen 
services help troubleshoot problems within the plant. 
services are divided into 3 categories: 
Alarm 
1. Equipment Trips, displayed in Red. 
2. Pre-equipment Trips, displayed in yellow. 
3. Trouble or local alarms, displayed in white. 
The hardware configuration for the plant computer . lS 
illustrated in Attachment F for the PMS and Attachment G for the 
DCS. DCS consists of remote analog and remote digital units 
which provide data from instruments located throughout the plant 
to switching units which transmit the data to the appropriate 
Data Acquisition Processor (DAP). The DAPs consist of two 
Honeywell 4400 processors, each scanning half of the inputs (at 4 
scans/sec for accurate processing). The variable data is then 
sent to two Honeywell processors called the Display Control 
Processors (DCP). Each is capable of sending all CRT data to 4 
Display Generators. A common memory allows data communication 
and data sharing between DCS and PMS. In addition, PMS consists 
of four Honeywell 4400 processors. 
following functions: 
Each performs one of the 
1. Data Acquisition Processor for Balance Of Plant Data. 
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2. NSS Processing, including data retrieval from PowerPlex. 
3. HRPD, Historical Data processing. 
4. BOP I/0 operations with peripheral devices. 
A status display of the DCS processors is provided on the 
Standby Information Panel {SIP), referred to as the test 
reconfiguration unit {see Attachment H). In "AUTO" mode, it 
provides self-checks from any hardware problems, sending a signal 
to display any problems. A manual check can also be completed by 
operators or engineers if data integrity is questioned. 
Each variable contained . in PPC has the 
(precoded internally) to change the display 
a preset value 
CRT when the 
increment is reached. Each CRT is split into a 80/20 format. The 
top 80% displays the screen and the bottom 20% displays any Alarm 
Initiated Display (AID). Information on the display is either 
background or dynamic information. Background information 
consists of display formats, labels and units of measure. 
Dynamic information consists of graphs, plots, and numeric 
values. Where applicable, a diagram of the piping of the system 
1s displayed (background), with the changing data from the 
process variables (dynamic) . The CRT screens also use a system 
of color-based visual hues intended to aid the operator in 
locating specific information. 
intended use are: 
The color schemes and their 
1. Green - Used for Lines and symbols in process diagrams to 
represent system components. 
15 
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2. Cyan Used as a supporting hue and applied to alpha 
numeric identification, scales and borders. 
I 
3. Yellow - Applied to all process variable display elements 
such as bar graphs and digital data. 
4. Red - Restricted to use as a visual cue from emergency or 
abnormal conditions. 
5. White - Used as a reference mark on scales adjacent to 
bar graphs to indicate process limits and to present low 
confidence data on instrumentation reliability. 
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III. GITARS - Pre•ent Scope 
GETARS is an acronym for General Electric Transient Analysis 
Recording System. GETARS is a third-generation system used 
initially for start-up testing at Power Water Reactors (PWR) and 
Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) power plants. Its popularity in 
nuclear plants is not a result of mandatory regulations, but from 
its ability . in a format to capture real-time data 
. 
unique 
engineering groups can use for such activities as surveillance 
tests, maintenance diagnostics, scram timing, and transient 
identification. It is used mainly by Shift Technical Advisors 
(STAs} and Engineering personnel. 
GETARS has a Data Acquisition System (DAS) designed to 
record and display plant and system operating data, which can 
then be used to document and analyze their performance. DAS can 
be interfaced to any available process instrument such as 
accelerometers, tachometers, level, radiation, displacement, 
pressure and flow instruments or, more generally, any signal that 
can be converted into an electrical output. It can record up to 
500 process signals, plus piping motion and rod scram time tests. 
The system monitors the reactor's response to planned 
transients, such as scram timing (which monitors the time it 
takes to insert a control rod into the reactor core to stop 
reactivity - see Attachment I for a sample run), Main Steam 
Isolation Valves (MSIV) closure times, and other surveillance and 
maintenance activities. However, its use is invaluable when the 
'' I I I:, I 
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plant experiences unplanned transients, such as turbine trips, 
level transients, and other events. 
GETARS has the capability to continuously check 50 setpoints 
for preset limits. The standard setpoint list includes 
parameters such as flux, pressure, flow and level. In a planned 
transient, the engineer usually inputs a step change while 
monitoring the controlled process variables in question. In an 
. 
unplanned transient, 1 . e . any exceeded preset limit on any of the 
50 monitored points, GETARS immediately saves the previous minute 
of data and 10-15 minutes of data following that event. The data 
that 1s saved involves 614 channels (from a possible 4096 
channels) of data from various operating variables. This data 
must be collected to identify any problems throughout the plant, 
and to monitor certain safety systems as to how they operated 
during a transient versus how they were designed to operate. In 
the event of a reactor scram, 
restart of power generation. 
this data is vital to support 
The basic hardware setup of GETARS involves a Hewlett 
Packard computer with 128K words of memory, a 50 M byte moving 
head disk for permanent and temporary storage, a 1600 bits/inch 
magnetic tape drive for permanent offline storage and backups, a 
terminal with 24 by 80 character monochrome video display and a 
Honeywell Visigraph printer/plotter for hard copies of data and 
qraphs. Fiqure 2 shows a simplified diagram of this hardware 
configuration. 
18 
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GETARS system Block Diagram 
Figure 2 
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DAS consis.ts of a master receiver, submultiplexer and remote 
multiplexers. The remote multiplexers receive the sensor signals 
from -10 to 10 volts (0 - 100% scale). The signal is sent at a 1 
MHz bit rate to the submultiplexer and the master receiver where 
the data can then be processed by GETARS. A total of 4096 
digital or analog signals can be interfaced. A Pulse Code 
Modulation (PCM) recorder can be used for high speed recording 
for tasks such as vibration analysis. This is currently not used 
at SSES. (See Attachment J for a simplified diagram of its DAS 
hardware configuration.) One system setup per unit is provided 
at SSES. 
The GETARS computer is capable of sampling rates ranging 
from 1 to 1,000 times per second, and can capture a maximum of 
1,000 samples per second, with a maximum throughput of 125,000 
samples per second. The DAS used with GETARS can sample at rates 
greater than 23,000 samples per second per channel. 
and records any selected 614 channels of signals 
It captures 
(from 4096 
channels available in the DAS), and at rates fast enough to 
permit resolution and analysis of almost instantaneous 
occurrences. 
Both memory-based and disk-based supervisory software is 
used at SSES. The memory-based software is a real time executive 
program that operates with very low overhead. It provides a 
controlled environment for the high-speed DAS programs, including 
SENTINEL and RECORD (Attachments K & L respectively). SENTINEL 
is a network of real-time programs which scans signals from both 
20 
/) 
I 
\ 
.: ''. ) .. 
~ ·.!;· '1 ' 
'. }' 
' 1/: 
,, 
,I·. 
I 
.f! 
4 ,,, 
analog and digital channel inputs. This system use was described 
earlier for planned and unplanned transients. It is similar in 
concept to an aircraft's flight recorder or switch yard 
oscillograph recorder. RECORD . network of real-time 1S a programs 
which scans and records analog signals on magnetic tape or disk 
and provides a real-time strip chart plot of signals during data 
acquisition. Data can be plotted in real-time from any of the 
614 channels but only 10 at a time can be plotted. The engineer 
has complete control of signal gain (engineering units), signal 
offset (where the plot 
Attachment M.) 
is to begin), and the time . axis. (See 
The disc-based software is a real-time executive system that 
provides data entry, data reduction, utility programs and program 
preparation functions. Figure 3 illustrates their relations. 
APPLICATION PROGRAMS 
DYNNO MANAGER 
DATABASE MANAGER 
I DATA BASES I 
VMEAN HIST 
,,, 
'' USER TERMINAL 
GETARS DISC-BASED Software 
FIGURE 3 
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The program pr~paration environment provides language processors, 
a source editor (EDIX), a relocating loader, and a file 
management package. These programs are primarily non-real-time 
data reduction and utility type programs. 
partial list of programs: 
The following is a 
o HIST Displays selected signal data in engineering units or 
millivolts. It also provides statistical data. 
o CALIB is an off-line program that will calculate slopes 
and intercepts in engineering units for user-selected 
analog channels. These can be used to update a point 
identification file automatically. 
o EXPAND is used to calculate the expansion or contraction 
of a pipe and can compare it to design limits. 
o FOREGROUND SENTINEL is the set of real-time programs that 
provides the same function as SENTINEL but allows 
concurrent program development and use. 
o Other Off-line programs include DISPLY, V MEAN and DYNNO 
which can be used to analyze data from previously recorded 
tapes. 
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IV. Analysis 
A. General 
,, 
·'' 
·1. 
Analysis of computer systems is directly tied to the 
SSES modifications prioritization process. Computer 
modifications are not just analyzed and rated against each 
other. 
along 
They are also ranked and their benefits are weighted 
with plant modifications 
installations, improvements to 
such 
safety 
as new pump 
systems (e.g.-
reducing water hammer 1n Emergency Service Water System.) 
Analysis of the computer systems . lS accomplished by 
answering the following questions: 
1. Are the hardware and software configurations in 
full compliance 
requirements? 
with government regulations and 
2. Are there any safety concerns or requirements? 
(Examples: any electrical or physical constraints or 
any probability of increasing an accident analyzed in 
the FSAR or creating the probability for an accident 
not defined in the FSAR.) 
3. Is the system reliable? 
4. Is the system outdated? Does it no longer meet the 
needs and requirements of the users of the system? Are 
there human factors is~ues that should be examined? 
5. Are there any other non-tangibles? Can 
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improvements be made to provide functions not 
previously intended for the system, but will improve 
the plant operations and engineering support? 
6. a. Can the changes be completed as minor 
modifications, where costs of implementing all 
changes and supporting documentation/training do 
not exceed $100,000; or 
b. Would it be a project requiring changes exceeding 
$100,000 with major change requirments in 
hardware and software changes, training 
requirements, new documentation and procedures? 
7. Will the changes result in any financial savings? 
(Cost/Benefit Analysis). 
Answers to these questions result in regulatory, safety 
requirements, and reliability factors being top priorities 
at SSES. Any other parameters (such as obsolete systems and 
new improvements) are secondary, but not ignored, especially 
if a change could be implemented as a minor project where 
limited resources will be needed and training requirements 
don't have to be implemented on a wide scale. The following 
portions of this section will analyze the Advanced Control 
Room (ACR) and General Electric Transient Analysis Recording 
System (GETARS) for all of the above issues. 
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B. A.CR 
1. Regulations governing design and operation of the ACR and 
Plant Process Computer (PPC) include: 
2 . 
a. 10 CFR Part 50 "Licensing of Production and 
Utilization Facilities, Appendix A, General Design 
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants." 
b. IEEE 279, 308, 323, 336, 338, 344 
Existing design considerations present no sa!iety 
concerns. 
3. Reliability 1s 99% which is not only acceptable from a 
regulatory standpoint, it is a commendable record. 
4. Human factors are an important consideration in a control 
room because the ease of identifying problems and the 
ability to react quickly are paramount concerns. This 1s 
accomplished by following the human factors guidelines 
set up by the NRC as NUREGs. References from the Human 
Factors Manual at SSES for control rooms include: 
o "Process Computers" includes guides on computer 
access, CRT displays and printer response times. 
o "Panel Layouts" includes control room panel layouts, 
which address topics such as panels used most frequently 
and required separation criteria for reliability. 
Although the ACR was developed over 15 years ago with GE 
and implemented over 7 years ago, the concept of this 
control room was the state of the art, and still exceeds 
most control room designs in the nuclear industry. The 
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latest development of control room technology by General 
Electric, one of the leaders in this industry, is presented 
in a product called "NUCLENET 1000". It implements the- same 
control room configuration as the ACR, with the only major 
difference seen by the operator being the streamlined alarm 
panels provided above the CRTs for human factors 
improvements {see Attachment N). Of course, a new system 
would also provide the latest in hardware such as the faster 
and expanded memory, more options at the control of plant 
operations, and better software development tools. These 
are non-tangibles, and will not weigh heavily when any 
decision is made to implement changes. 
5. Improvements to the ACR in two forms: 
a. Through GETARS and 
b. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). 
The implementation of SPDS supplements the ACR with 
improvements that go beyond the original design and intent 
of the ACR. Briefly, this system provides the operators and 
Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) with concise and easy-to-
understand data relating to plant safety. It does not 
replace the ACR but it does focus on broad safety functions, 
determines which . 1S providing reliable instrumentation 
information by synthesizing the data into a final form 
useful for diagnosis and decisions, and relieves both 
parties from tedious calculations that are needed quickly 
during emergency scenarios. SPDS was a product of the 
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requirements mandated by the NRC through the.following 
NUREG's: 
1. NUREG-0737 "Clarification of the TMI Action Plan 
Requirements". 
2. NUREG-0696 "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response 
Facilities". 
3 . NUREG-0654 "Requirements for Emergency Response 
Capability". 
These regulations were not intended to preclude the design 
and intent of the ACR but to supplement the ACR with 
improvements recognized by the industry as an extension 
needed for plant operations to maintain the safety of the 
public. The most important aspects of SPDS is the primary 
display that includes reactor power, reactor water level, 
reactor pressure, drywell pressure and total noble gas 
effluent. 
6/7. The current capabilities of the ACR are satisfactory 
the operators' needs in a control room in meeting 
environment. Many of these capabilities go beyond the 
requirements set by the NRC and other governing agencies. 
Other items such as the NUCLENET are 'nice to have' and 
would only be feasible if the changes . were on a minor 
modification scale requiring small monetary resources and 
limited manpower. A preliminary cost/benefit analysis would 
indicate that the scope of a new hardware and software 
system would be extremely costly, and training requirements 
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for the new alarm panels would require retraining of the six 
shifts of 7 operators each shift. For what is envisioned as 
returns of mostly a non-tangible nature, it would not appear 
to currently benefit SSES to invest in a large scale 
replacement and/or upgrade of the existing ACR. 
C. GETARS 
1/2. GETARS has been accepted in the nuclear industry as 
not only a start-up test program, but also as an answer to 
the NRC Generic Letter 83-28. This letter set the precedent 
for all nuclear power plants to evaluate control room 
instrumentation against scram analysis criteria to determine 
the level of instrumentation needed to conduct a scram 
analysis. This analysis includes: 
a. showing proper safety system functioning per their 
design and 
b. finding the cause of the scram prior to any re-start 
of a nuclear power plant. 
Many plants use a transient recording system to determine or 
assist 1n determining how the plant functions versus 
depending on operation observation and on the slower plant 
process computers of the ACR. It 1s important to keep 
GETARS performing as well as the process computers of the 
ACR and adhering to the criteria followed for the ACR. 
Currently, GETARS meets all regulatory requirements and does 
not present a safety issue at SSES. 
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J. GSTARS' reliability record runs close to 100% for being 
available during transients and capturing 180 out of 185 
scram timings at each transient. This meets PP&L's standard 
I for reliability. Reliability has an outstanding record 
because of the precautions that are taken to prevent any 
misuse of this system. However, the problems with this 
environment are addressed next. 
4. During any user interaction with the available programs, 
such as VMEAN, the scanning rate of GETARS is reduced and 
may cause the transient recording system to fail to respond 
as quickly as it does while in SENTINEL mode. This raises 
some questions as to how such a useful system can be made 
available to all engineers who need data for . various 
analysis. One approach which could be implemented to update 
this aspect of GETARS is the use of minicomputers or 
personal computers (PC) for optional accessing. Two 
concepts could be incorporated into the existing GETARS. 
They are: 
a) To utilize GETARS DAS and incorporate logic where a 
PC would interface with the HP central processor for 
needed information. 
database with the HP. 
The PC would share a common 
The interface between the two 
would be via a commercial software communications 
package and a communications port. Other commercial 
packages such as operating systems, full screen 
editors, language compilers and menu driven screen 
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formats can be used to support this interface. The 
latest in PCs and color graphic displays can be used to 
create a responsive real-time and user friendly 
environment. Figure 4 represents this concept. 
COLOR 
I 
GRAPHICS 
' \ 
PRINTER ,/ 
... 
MICRO/PC 
DATABASE / \. 
' ~ 
COMMUNICATIONS 
LINK 
GETARS/PC Block Diagram 
FIGURE 4 
HP 
PROCESSOR 
DATABASE 
.,, 
GETARS 
DAS 
b) Another possible configuration, available to access 
the various data points read 1n GETARS, would be to 
have a separate DAS irnbedded in the PC. This would 
. 
require an interface to the additional hardware 
existing Validyne Data Communications Equipment (DCEs). 
A separate program could be developed to access data at 
a different rate than what GETARS currently does. This 
option provides a little more flexibility and 
separation from the HP processor. This method has also 
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been successfully demonstrated in various ~lants on 
projects such as monitoring thermal losses in the 
primary cycle. 
COLOR 
GRAPHICS ;" 
" 
PRINTER ,. 
' 
Figure 5 illustrates this concept. 
MICRO/PC 
DATABASE 
COMM. SOFT 
' \ 
1/ 
MICRO/PC 
DCE AND/OR 
DSU/CSU 
./ 
' 
' 
r
COMMUNICATIONS 
LINK 
HP 
PROCESSOR 
DATABASE 
I ~ 
GETARS 
DAS 
GETARS/PC with Separate DAS Block Diagram 
FIGURE 5 
Additionally, there are human factors issues which are 
ignored in GETARS. In its initial application, it was 
intended for temporary use. Thus, many unfriendly 
interactive screen sessions still exist in the version of 
GETARS that SSES uses. Attachment o shows that GETARS is 
not consistent in many areas with SSES policies outlined 
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from the SSES Human Factors manual. Most of these items 
have been corrected in the newer versions of GETARS because 
they include a full menu format for data input and program 
queries by the user. However, better use of graphics could 
be implemented if a micro-computer and a work station were 
used to replace some of the functions of the plant process 
computer. 
5. What improvements could GETARS make that go beyond the 
original definition of its use? Already GETARS has lived an 
extended life from plant start-ups and has demonstrated its 
usefulness for scram recoveries and surveillance tests. 
Improvements could be made to eliminate a time 
consuming task that the Shift Technical Advisors (STAs) must 
do to obtain facts from GETARS to compile data needed in the 
scram analysis. This can be accomplished through pre-
formatted reports programmed into a PC. If a PC was 
physically connected to GETARS as explained earlier for 
optional data retrieval, a floppy disk can be written by 
GETARS containing the transient data to be analyzed using a 
stand-alone PC for pre-formatted processing and future 
networking capabilities. This pre-formatted data would 
include safety parameter responses, valve closure times, all 
of which is normally obtained from GETARS. This step would 
help eliminate any errors created by human intervention in 
data re-entry. 
6/7. The human factors issues should be implemented by 
32 
upgrading to the next generation of GETARS provided by GE. 
This would create a more user-friendly interactive session 
with the use of menus and better error identification. 
Also, a PC/work-station connection should be made and 
available for use by all interested engineering groups. 
access to GETARS without This would provide better 
jeopardizing reliability. The cost of the equipment and 
available commercial software would place this item in the 
category of a minor modification, with . savings to be 
recouped from more efficient engineering analyses. 
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v·~ Introduction of Bxpert Systems 
A. General 
"Expert Systems", computer th t · t programs a 1ncorpora e 
the sophisticated knowledge and thought processes of 
experts, are no longer science fiction but rather the newest 
form of the computer science and industrial engineering 
fields. Applications of expert systems can be split into 
three areas: 
1. Applications where tasks involve diagnostics, 
analysis and I or troubleshooting. 
2. Applications that deal with subjects for which 
limited experts are available. 
3. Applications involving analysis in which some facts 
exist, but only imprecisely. 4 
Expert systems are best applied to solving problems in which 
the subject is highly detailed, but not tightly defined. 
Expert systems are not suited for solving problems in which 
the causes of a problem are diverse and unrelated. 
At SSES, many applications are potential candidates, 
these include but not limited to, the following areas: 
1. ACR-related; 
a. Implementation of Control Room Procedures-
4 Dickey, Samuel, "Expert Sys terns: Distilling Business Savvy", Today's Office, June 1986. 
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including Operating Procedures (OPs), Off Normal 
Procedures 
Procedures. 
( ONs) , and Emergency Operating 
b. Any application involving 
operators. 
2. GETARS-related; 
a. Diagnostics 
b. CRD Timing 
c. Surveillance Testing 
d. Scram Recovery 
3. Other Applications; 
a. Technical Specifications (TS) 
b. Emergency Plans 
B. Advanced Control Room (ACR) 
memorization by 
During the analysis of the ACR it was mentioned that 
applications do exist which go beyond the original design 
and intent of the ACR. In the control room, procedures are 
developed for all operating conditions. Current reference 
to these procedures 1s through manual research of the 
hardcopy procedures. . a prime These procedures appear to 
candidate for expert system applications. The most 
promising of the procedures mentioned above would be the 
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). These procedures 
have a series of conditions that must be addressed quickly 
in a decision-making process. The tests for the conditions 
35 
.. 
1. 
·" ,,· l· 
are predefined, but the path which is followed depends on 
the results of the test. Hence, they appear to be a 
suitable candidate for an expert system application. 
The EOPs are only used during an abnormal event where 
an operating parameter exceeds one of its predefined limits. 
These parameters, known as 'entry' conditions, are plant 
parameters that are available from both the ACR and the 
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). During these 
. 
scenarios, operators utilize specially designed 3'x3' 
laminated boards containing the detailed information from 
the procedures. These boards are helpful in that they do 
what a expert system does they prompt the users for 
information, and guide them to the next logical step. 
Depending on the abnormal event, entry is made into one of 
the ten EOPs. Different paths can be followed, depending on 
plant parameters and on decisions that are made by the 
operators, assisted by prompts from the board. Exit from 
the EOP is made once the entry condition and, ultimately, 
the plant, 1s stabilized. The main disadvantage over use of 
these boards is that they are numerous (at least one per 
EOP), cumbersome, and generally difficult to manage. The 
entries and guidelines of these boards and the EOPs make an 
optimal knowledge-base for an expert system. 
To better explain the methodology of incorporating EOPs 
into expert systems, the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) 
Control (EOP 102), will be referenced. Attachment P shows a 
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simplified version for easier reference. 
The following figure 6 gives a simplified block diagram 
of the components required to make ·.this expert system 
function. 
ACR EXPERTS (BWR OPERATORS) 
PLANT 
DATA 
DATA 
BASE 
INPUT/ 
OUTPUT 
I USER 
KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUISITION 
KNOWLEDGE 
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INFERENCE 
ENGINE 
INPUT/ 
OUTPUT 
I USER 
ACR Expert Operating System 
Figure 6 
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The right side shows the.interrelations between the 
components of an typical expert system, including; 1). the 
knowledge-base which contains the guides and rules detailed 
in the EOPs; 2). an inference engine that contains inference 
rules and user interfaces to gain the desired input/output 
that the user needs to help make a decision; 3). the 
inference shell that could help simplify the development of 
the EOP knowledge-base and inference engine. The left side 
of the figure contains a simplified block diagram of the 
existing process computer containing the needed information 
and the database. The inference engine must obtain the 
plant parameters that are needed to complete the expert 
system. 
Since the knowledge-base is already predefined in the 
EOPs, the knowledge acquisition 1s 80% complete. The 
knowledge-base would contain the five entry conditions and 
other entries from other EOPs to start the inference process 
of the expert system. In this EOP, three paths must be 
executed simultaneously, with each section containing an If-
Then-Else sequence. When an entry condition exists for an 
EOP, an alarm should be provided to the operator, as well as 
a signal to the inference engine to begin processing the 
applicable EOP. Plant parameters that are reliable as 
indicated by the process computer can be fed into the 
inference engine and can be shown to the operator on the 
EOP. Any needed information can be prompted to the operator 
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so the next decision can be made until the entry condition 
stabilizes and an exit out of the procedure is reached. 
C. G.E. Transient Analysis and Recording System (GETARS) 
Four of the eight expert applications mentioned earlier 
in this section can be developed through the GETARS system. 
These are: 
1. Scram Recovery 
2. Surveillance Testing 
3. Diagnostics 
4. CRD Timing 
Currently the Shift Technical Advisor compiles information 
from several sources and determine what caused the scram. 
This 'Scram Recovery' is necessary prior to restarting the 
affected reactor. Since GETARS is used for all this 
information (unless the GETARS system was not running), it 
would be appropriate to have GETARS determine the cause of 
the scram. The knowledge-base would consist of both the 
Operator's and STA's background on transient analysis as 
defined in the FSAR and the scram trip signals from the 
Reactor Protection System (RPS}. (See Attachment Q for all 
the possible signals from RPS that will cause a reactor 
scram and Attachment R for a list of the most common 
analyzed transients in the FSAR.) Operators and STAs are 
trained on the possible causes and the reactor's corrective 
39 
' . \(. 
.. '\.: ·. ' 
response for all transients analyzed in the FSAR. If the 
reactor's response does not correct the transient, the RPS 
initiates a scram from the . various 
designed to stop the transient. 
built-in protections 
The instruments that 
measure the parameters in these transients, such as reactor 
pressure and reactor temperature, have two separate channels 
that are wired into the DAS portion of GETARS. This gives 
GETARS added redundancy in case of a failed instrument and 
thus would make the expert system accurate in its analysis. 
Figure 7 on the next page shows the relationship of the 
expert system to GETARS. The right side represents the 
expert system components and the left side represents 
GETARS' components; this representation will be easier to 
implement if GETARS utilized a separate mini-computer for 
this activity. Either forward-chaining or backward-chaining 
methods can be used to determine the cause of the scram. In 
the backward-chaining method, the user (STA) can guess at 
what caused the scram. The expert system can then chain 
backwards to determine if various parameters responded to 
that type of accident, thus confirming the STAs guess. In 
the forward-chaining method, the expert system . reviews any 
parameters that were out of a predefined range at the time 
of the scram. It can then follow possible paths to 
determine the accident type that caused the scram. The 
forward-chaining method is the best method, since it does 
not require an expert (the STA) to be present for prompting. 
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This ·a11ow•1: the STA to complete other work duties. 
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Surveillance testing is another expert application that 
can be applied to GETARS. Experts in both GETARS and the 
system expert for the surveillance must be involved in the 
test. When a test is run, normally the expert would review 
certain parameters for the proper predefined responses. 
These parameters must be analyzed for response times and for 
the proper response actions (such as a valve closure). The 
experience of the system expert can be captured in the 
knowledge-base so the test can be run without the expert 
present. An expert system can systematically review all 
parameters and determine if the test was a success. 
The CRD timing and diagnostic applications operate on 
the same principles as surveillance testing. These 
applications can be implemented in-house (as described 
above) or they can be purchased from various companies that 
have already developed expert systems in these two areas. 
GE is the manufacturer of the CRD's and Hydraulic Control 
Units (HCUS) and have serviced this equipment over the last 
20 years. They have developed this knowledge-base into an 
expert system called 'DRIVEX'. DRIVEX diagnoses both CRD 
and HCU problems like one of their veteran CRD diagnostic 
engineers, without the high cost of calling in the engineer 
each time a problem occurs. The system runs on any PC or 
PC-Compatible computer, and interfaces with the existing 
GETARS DAS and graphics systems. Problems such any CRD 
insertion and withdrawal timing errors are handled, as well 
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as vartatio1_1s of hundreds of possible malfunctions·. Since·-' 
the development of a new computer system is costly, the use 
of this 'off~the-shelf' type, package would presumably be 
the best cost effective path to take. 
D. Other Applications 
Other applications include: 
1 . Technical Specifications - which are NRC required 
and company created specifications that each nuclear plant 
must adhere to. Any deviation from the specifications causes 
a Limiting Condition for Operations {LCO). The company has 
a predefined time frame allowed to resolve the discrepency 
causing the LCO and thus bringing the company into 
compliance with the TS and avoiding a forced shutdown of the 
affected unit. Each time frame 1s based on the type of 
problems causing the LCO. The current TSs are located in a 
hardcopy manual layout in a cumbersome format. References 
are difficult to find if one 1s not familiar with this 
layout. This might also be suited to hypertext. 
2. Emergency Plans - where an optimum evacuation plan 
can be developed, depending on the direction of the wind and 
topography . 
Applications to Technical Specifications and to Emergency 
Planning were briefly mentioned to show the need for improvements 
in these areas. This was also done to demonstrate the potential 
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versatility and the 
future implementation of 
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wide-ranging capabilities 
expert systems. 
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VI. The Integrati~Jl of lxpert Systems. 
The computerization of knowledge and decision-making in 
expert systems represents a fundamental change in plant operation 
technology. Certain management acceptance and organizational 
adaptation are needed for expert syst~ms to be successfully 
integrated. There are basic industry principles to be followed 
when introducing a new technology. Certain principles can be 
remembered when deciding which expert system to present first: 
1. New technologies are usually expensive and crude when 
first introduced. The first introduction of expert systems 
were developed 1n languages such as COBOL, PL/1, LOTUS on 
machines that were used for other corporate purposes. These 
systems had limitations that probably are not forgotten by 
some managers. 
2. Technologies have their limitations. Expert systems 
should not be considered where the domain has not been 
developed yet. A more common application should be used 
first when the success rate is high. {ACR is high risk, 
where applications such as DRIVEX are low risk because 
expert diagnostic packages have been developed and used.) 
3 . Both new and old technology can grow together until 
finally the new technology is accepted. The old methods do 
not have to disappear. Again, GETARS would be an ideal 
environment in which to have the old and new co-exist. 
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Deci•ic,n1 c-.n,: .. ·Jie made based upon experri•nee and· researeh. ' ',.,·):,\ 
Once prciperlytested in an operating environment, the expert 
system can be run to determine the cause of a SCRAM. The 
old and new can be compared. As the new GETARS gains a good 
track record, the old one can be phased out. 
4. organizations will usually marginally 
recognize the value of a new technology. PP&L is one of the 
Unsuccessful 
leading plants in the nuclear industry and is recognized as 
a successful organization. They are positively grounded in 
innovation, and at the same time plant operations are not 
jeopardized. 
5. Successful integration of new technology almost always 
. 
requires internal Internal in the champion. an 
organization, the expert systems must be presented . in a 
persistent manner to upper level management. Proposals and 
backup capability are essential for success. (DRIVEX 
presents a problem not having an expert internal to the 
organization.) 
6. Acceptance and integration of new technologies are always 
under fire. Again, the old concept "It's better to start 
small and be successful" definitely applies to new 
technology. Implementation, slow, small, and safe also 
leaves a lasting positive impression on management when it 
comes time for future implementation. 
7. Social acceptance of new technology must not intimidate 
those experts that must be relied on to make the expert 
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'. system a success. Care must be taken to ensure that expert 
system introduction does not supplant existing employees 
(STA's and engineering employees). 
kill a system propsal in a hurry. 
Company politics could 
8. It is preferable to maximize return at minimum risk. 
Usually, one will incur a larger risk (increased investment) 
proportional to the size and function (closer to a central, 
primary process) of the unit. The safest investment to go 
with is a pre-developed package that has demonstrated 
potential, along with support expertise to guarantee its 
service and availability. 
9. A system that has no recognized problems, and is 
performing well in the eyes of management, is not the system 
to go after with proposed improvements (expert application). 
It is easier to obtain approval for a system that has a 
history of trouble, one that is perceived as an important 
system, and one that can be converted with a maximum of 
improvement and a minimum of cost. 
10. An additional consideration, particularly for nuclear 
power plants, is safety. If the margin of safety is 
demonstrated to be improved substantially by implementation 
of an expert system, even at a significant cost, a prudent 
management may embrace the package. 
improved safety is considered priceless. 
In some circles, 
These rules must be kept in mind while selecting and presenting 
the first potential expert system to management. The reason for 
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imp:lem·enting any project is directly tied to payoff or rate of 
return. In general, the simpler the scope of the project, the 
fewer unknowns, the lower the perceived risk, the higher the 
chances are of management approving the project. The old 
cost/benefit analysis be difficult apply • 1n to may more 
determining the relative merit of new technologies. Things such 
as developmental cost (engineering and programmer development) 
and initial hardware and software purchases to support expert 
system development must be examined. A higher risk venture may 
bear merit in certain cases because competition is very keen and 
the very existence of a business may depend upon how "state of 
the art" its operations are. 
Reasons other than financial savings may be very significant 
in weighing the importance of a proposed expert system. Non-
tangibles often have to be "quantified", such as viability of a 
proposed system in solving a prevailing corporate problem that 
cannot be solved otherwise. Determination may also have to be 
made whether or not the problem is solved partially or entirely, 
and whether the problem reoccur in the future. 
One example of a desirable system to upgrade is one that may 
undergo a relatively modest installation to im~lement an expert 
system status, and by doing so, may relieve the company of a 
cadre of highly-paid "required" consultants to maintain, support, 
and supplement the current system. The installation proposal, in 
this case, may result in a high rate of return for the company. 
Based upon the attached assessment (Attachment S) and the 
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ab~ve discussion, DRiiEX is th~ most suitable exp•rt system 
application to supplement the diagnostic capabilities of the 
GETARS. At a relatively low cost, and with guaranteed support 
personnel, implementation of this system would increase the level 
of safety at SSES. And, at the same time, DRIVEX implementation 
can create a financial rate of return by reducing ongoing 
engineering costs which would be incurred in hydraulic control 
unit (HCU) and control rod drive (CRD) diagnostics. 
Upon the demonstrated success of the DRIVEX system, company 
management awareness of the capabilities of expert system 
technology would be greatly enhanced. At this point, a secondary 
system may be proposed for installation 1n the GETARS. This 
system could then be developed by in-house personnel to perform 
some of the tedious decision-making involved 1n post-scram or 
post-accident analysis. There 1s an obvious financial rate of 
return here 1n saved technical costs and an increased factor of 
safety by having the expert system aid in the decision-making 
process. Additional costs are eliminated by having the down unit 
return to service much more quickly with the aid of the expert 
system. 
The third area of substantial improvement . . at m1n1mum cost 
would be the "expertization" of Technical Specifications. 
Available PC packages (such as VP Expert, Guide 2.0 or Level 5) 
could be obtained and adapted in-house at a minimal investment to 
the company. Recouped engineering costs would be immediate and 
substantial, because technical specification analyses are 
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performed con·atantly. Many of the cumbersome logic pathways can 
be expertized (relatively asily) , eliminating the need for 
tedious, and repetitive, and redundant work. 
Ultimately, expert systems applications will inevitably be 
made in the ACR (EOP expertization in the near future), and in 
perhaps all other systems involving decision-making processes 
that have not been discussed. Many of these, however, will 
involve future technology improvements and simplification that 
will correspondingly reduce 
expert system application. 
the 
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Future· ne.velopments VII. 
Over the next several years changes will become visible as 
modern managers are challenged by this new technology. Almost 
all organizations of the future, in order to maintain a 
competitive edge, will need to find ways to incrirporate expert 
systems into their day-to-day operations. This force, driven by 
intense competition, will create increasing demands for higher 
software productivity and reliability, better identification of 
true expertise, 
systems capable 
establishing more knowledge bases, developing 
of addressing more complex problems, and 
inventing faster processors. Management information systems, 
computer . sciences, engineering departments at and industrial 
universities and colleges across the nation are continuously 
adding research programs, courses, and specialties addressing 
these issues. Most estimates of the combined size of the AI 
market in 1990 range from two to three billion dollars; expert 
systems will account for 20-30% of this total. These above 
actions and statistics will help SSES address the issues of using 
expert systems with the ACR, including the EOPs and even more 
decision-making processes that the operators must address in 
every day operations. 
A key to the commercial success of any innovation is how the 
leading companies respond to it. With expert systems the 
response has been tremendous. Major . companies, such as Ford, 
Sperry, Texas Instruments, and the Department of Defense, have 
! ,· 
I 
~-
been actively developing million dollar-projects involving expert 
systems applications. 
As future expert systems become more complex and integrated, 
severe demands will be placed on current hardware technology. 
Current technology must be improved, or new technology must be 
develop~d, to accommodate these demands. These developments have 
already been taking place in companies such as Texas Instruments 
in their development of the Compact Lisp Machine, and Bell 
Laboratories with their development of parallel processing which 
has enabled them to create an expert system on a single chip. 
Eventually, expert systems will affect almost every area of 
operations of an organization and could become the most integral 
part of an organization's normal operations of the future. 
Potential applications range from management to production. With 
the increased application use of expert systems, more powerful 
systems will This . economic demand will pull the be demanded. 
forces of research to develop more sophisticated hardware, which 
is already been seen with Bell Lab's expert chip and parallel 
processing. We will be at the point where the limitations to an 
expert system will be the human knowledge and understanding - not 
the hardware and software. This will make almost any application 
with decision-making at SSES, a solvable expert system. 
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At SSBS, computer technologies have been an aggressive area 
of deve1opment. Two of the current computer systems that support 
plant operations and engineering personal, the Advanced Control 
Room (ACR) and GE's Transient Analysis and Recording System 
(GETARS), are definite signs of this progressive attitude in the 
past years. To keep this . progressive and competitive edge, 
management must assess these systems and propose improvements. 
Minor improvements to these existing computer systems include; 
1) • provide . easier both to the ACR and GETARS for access 
engineering personnel, 2) upgrade GETARS' operating and software 
systems and most importantly, 3) to integrate the new 
technologies in the computer and industrial fields. "Expert" 
systems is the one of the newer technologies that can enhance 
plant operations and help . . support engineering activities. Many 
applications are good candidates for expert systems; however, the 
following applications should be introduced to management, in the 
listed order, for a greater acceptance and success rate: 
I," 
1. Install DRIVEX with GETARS for "expert" diagnostics. 
2. Develop and install an expert system on GETARS for scram 
recovery. 
3. Develop and install an expert system on a PC for easier 
access and retrieval of Technical Specifications. 
4. Develop and install an expert system to address the 
Emergency Operating Procedures on the ACR. 
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Sample Output - :Maximum, Minimum and Averaged Scram Times 
CORE AVERACED SCRAM TIMES. 
NOTCH ,s 39 25 5 
TIME 
.2&3• .sss, 1 • 212, 2.31,, 
MAXIMUM SCRAM TIMES. 
NOTCH ,1 39 25 5 
ROD ID 21,3, 31,,2 27,26 27,21 
TIME • 211• .584. 1. 359. 2.s,31 
MINIMUM SCRAM TIMES. 
NOTCH •s 39 25 I 
ROD ID 19 .11 19, 11 19, 11 19, 11 
TIME 
.2551 .536. I • 183• 2.1911 
Sample Output - Scram Times Update 
LIST OF ROOS FOR WHICH SCRAM TIMES HAVE BEEN UPDATED 
TIME TO NOTCH# ROD ID DATE TIME 45 39 25 15 STATUS 
, 7, 18 3/ 2,1, 23116 .263 .552 1.271 2.359 2 39,22 3/ 211, 23116 .zss .s,, 1.271 2.383 2 35,,2 3/ 211, 23116 .271 .sa, 1.,19 2.,23 2 31.s• 3/ 2/84 23116 .2,3 .5,, 1. , 7 2.327 2 27,26 3/ 211, 23116 .263 .5,. 1.359 2.s,3 2 27,3, 3/ 211, 23116 .271 .568 1.327 2.,1, 2 19 .1. 3/ z,,, 23a16 .255 .536 1.183 Z. 191 2 
--------------------------------------~----------------------------~----------------~ AVERA,£ TIMES 
.263 .555 1.282 2.386 
NUMIER Of RODS u,DATED1 7 
Sample GETARS Output - Min.,Max., and Scram Times 
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SENTINEL - SIGNAL SURVELILLANCE AND RECORDING 
SENilNEL Sample Input 
altU~llTEM,SNTNL 
EHTE~ THE WORK FILE• (OR -1 TO ABORT> ••. 
RUN II I 
NEW IUN. c•c1t• INCREMENT RUN., 
DESCRJ,TION •••• RTEM SNTNL RUN• 1 
CHANCE DESCRIPTION [VES,NOl 
RUN• DESCRIPTION 
1 RTEN SNTNL RUN• 1 
PLAV IACK PCM DATA? CVES,NOl 
SAMPLE PLAN t•B CHANNELS 
S E N T I N E l 
SET TIME 
•TM,191,.1,,12,3• 
•Ru.Ro, 
1111 
,o 
RU, ROft 
7777 
Tl 
111,.1,,12.31.,s.1,1 
•au .ao, 
1111 
sro, 
S V S T E H 8 0 0 T I N G 
GETARS Sentinel Sample Output 
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RECORO - DATA ACQUISITION SUBSYSTEM ONE 
RECORD Sample Input 
ENTER THE WORK FILE• (OR -1 TO ABORT> ••. 
llUN fl 1 
NEW RUN# ('CR• INCREMENT RUN#) 
DESCRIPTION .... RTEM RECORD RUN• 1 
CHANGE DESCRIPTION [VES.NOl 
RUN• DESCRIPTION 
1 RTEM RECORD RUN• 1 
PLAY IACK PCM DATA? CVES.NOl 
SAMPLE PLAN 1 TH~OUGH 1•• 
R E C O R D 
SET TIME 
AUTO CUTOFF 1 
VES 
*RU.ROP 
7777 
PLOT 
*RU.ROP 
7777 
STOft 
S V S T E M BOOTINCi 
GETARS RECORD Sample Output 
ATTACHMENT L-1 
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l . ,J 
1 
1 
NO 
NO 
,_·,~ 
( 
. , . 
... 
' 
i 
I. 
i 
RECORD Sempla Output 
I I A L T J " I P L O r 
•••W11•lt11i•.. PLOT TIACU, All ONLY A,,aC.XIHAT IOHS AHD SIIUlilD NOT IC US(U f Da FU OUl NCV Atu.L YIIS 
IN • I ttOPI CIIII DINO 
IATI lll••UI 
,, .. 11, ,. 1,111 
CUN I CNAN• 
CIIAI ••a CNAI ... I CNAN• CNAI l•I 
INCN 
JIii.i IU 
11V NV 
111 IUl,1 IU 
•• • .• °'' 
•c. I. OIIC. •.• °'' •. OIC. 
1,.,,,s1c.,,111 LINI 
I CNAN• 
' 
CHAN• • CNAN• 1 CNAN •• , CHAN H• CNAN 117 DIC, MY INCN 1., ru 21., ru 11111.I IU , .. I.I OH 71.1 OH •.• 0,, 
••• I. Olli. 1. DIC. I. OIC. II. 
... 
GETARS RECORD Sample Output 
ATTACHMENT L-2 
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.. 
II 
(Continued) 
'1'\ I 
,,. 
', .. , 
emu- 183 
111T 
110 
IU 1e.e 
• or, 
••• OIIC. t. 
LIIII: I 
\ 18UBL 7 
IPOllT 14 
..... 
81 .... -
..... 
..... 
...... 
or r ~-LI RI PLO~ 
f'lt111LI UI CAL r ILi! :va-,at * 
t'll,1 II I \ 
llU" 111t1 I. 
IJ.\·rr. 2/l&l&t 
TUM ft START or ROI 11 21 181 116 
~t:ft'fllH!L TRIP C111 183 AT 11 3s 381 494 
nr.c:tJIIUftC AT 80.N _SECS. '"°" 8TAR1" o, RUlf 
I. CMN)SF.C. /GR ID LI If E 
CRAIi• 2 CHAii• S2fi 
8CMA CIID44 
DIG D1C4 
EU .... EU IMN.t o,, 
••• orr ••• ORG. 3. ORG. s. 
LlftK I LlftlC 14 
ISUDL 6 ISUBL I 
r Potrr 17 IPORT 19 
I I 
l 
__, 
' I, 
CHAR• 827 CHAR• 
CRD+G ICY-A 
D1C4 VOLT 
EU INM.e EU 
orr •·• orr 
ORG. 7. OllC. 
LlftlC 14 LIJIIC 
I SUBL I I 8UBL 
I PORT 2e I PORT 
' 
I I 
r;~ . -- --·--. 
GETARS Sample of Plotter Format 
ATTACHMBNT M 
10 
St 
I ..... 
••• 8. 
I 
I 
6 
27 
I 
'·· 
,.1_~· ,l''.i ·, · 1 
I 
\ 
... 
., . . : 
, 
INDICATOR¥, 
RECORDERS, I 
COIITIIIOLLERI 
:,(. 
,·, ... ·i,· 
ALARM 
CRT 
CORE 
DISPLAY 
'/,I 
1 ·, 
I ALAAM J 
CRT 
NSPS_.UCLEAR SYSTEM PROTECTION SYSTEM 
RCIS-ROD CONTROL AND INFORMATION .-.,,t\,. 
SYSTEM 'It'° V(/,9 
NMS .. EUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM (It_.,-, t o,, 
NUCLENET Operator Control Console 
ATTACHMENT N 
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INDICATORS. 
RECOIIIDEIII, I 
CONTIIIOllfa 
;: 
l:_; 
'l -~ ,,. 
. ·•1 
.. , 
.·· 'j . • ~ _' ·,' I 
,1· 
·.: 
SECTION DESCRIPTION EVALUATION 
-----------------------------------------------------------------6.7.1.4 
6.7.2.4 
sec. ( f) 
sec. ( g) 
sec. (p) 
6.7.2.5 
6.7.2.6 
6.7.2.7 
6.7.3.1 
Data Entry Keyboards 
Data Presentation 
Format 
menus 
lists 
Labels 
Screen Layout and 
Structuring 
Messages 
Graphics Capability 
Screen to printer 
capability 
Keyboard not the req'd 
spacing 
Currently line by line entry 
Currently difficult to view 
Needs highlighting 
Needs general improvements 
Needs User Friendly error 
messages 
Use of color graphics can 
provide easier screen 
. . 
v1ew1ng 
Currently not available 
GETARS HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION 
ATTACHMENT 0 
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r·. 
'· 
'i,1 
,',,,.1 
., 
•· 1· 
' '. 
',.',·.,: 
SIMPLIPIBD RPV CONTROL 102 
FIVE ENTRY CONDITIONS 
I 
ENTRIES FROM OTHER EOPS 
I (Execute the three paths below, simultaneously) 
Reactor Cntl 
REDUCE POWER 
Reactor Cntl 
LEVEL 
EXIT WHEN: 
1. REACTOR is SHUTDOWN. 
I 
Reactor Cntl 
PRESSURE 
2. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water 
LEVEL STABILIZED at> -38". 
3. RPV PRESSURE is UNDER CONTROL. 
ENTER SCRAM PROCEDURE E0-100-101 
CAUTIONS & NOTES I 
Simplified RPV Control 102 
ATTACHMBHT P 
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.~ 
·,. 
'.'.'; ,'~ ; ' 
,,.,, 
·i; -i:'· 
,:1 ,' 
··,·. 
-:~ . , ~;,, 
,.'·, 
Reactor Protection System (RPS) Parameters 
1. Intermediate Range Monitors - High Flux 
2. Average Power Range Monitors - High Flux, etc. 
3. Reactor Pressure Steam Dome Pressure - High 
4. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low 
5. Main Steam Line Isolation Value - Closure 
6. Main Steam Line Radiation - High 
7. Drywell Pressure - High 
8. Scram Discharge Volume Level - High 
9. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 
10. Turbine Control Value Fast Closure 
11. Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown 
12. Manual Scram 
RPS Parameters 
ATTACHMENT Q 
.. 
74 
., 
I 
,,· !< 
,., 
·,'l 
'l'r•nsienta Analyzed in the FSAR 
1. Decrease in Reactor Pressure 
2. Increase in Reactor Pressure 
3. Decrease in Reactor Coolant Temperature 
4. Decrease in Reactor Coolant Flow Rate 
5. Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies 
6. Electric Distribution Malfunctions 
7. Loss of Coolant Accidents 
8. Containment Response to a LOCA 
FSAR Transients 
ATTACHMENT R 
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t ·:,.\ ' 
'•. J 
') 
:,:.', 
~· 1 
,., 
;; 
,,- __ /\ 
ISSUE ACR GETARS GETARS 
(EOP) DRIVEX SCRAM 
Past Experience no YES no 
Internal Expert YES no YES 
Manageable Size no YES ? . 
Minimize Risk no YES no 
Current Problems no YES YES 
Cost Savings ? YES YES . 
Safety Range ? YES YES . 
# YES 1 6 4 
Prioritization of EXPERT System Development 
ATTACHMENTS 
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' .\.' 
GETARS 
OTHER 
no 
YES 
YES 
no 
YES 
? 
. 
? 
. 
3 
: . (;, 
f;'; 
.:.~:J j:, 
-_\} 
:, 
-~\ 
\\ 
i·: 
.•'. ,, 
,-_-i 
'·I· 
.,-
t. 
.. 
,. 
t· 
-11'.. 
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